Since 2022, the sentiment in the Chinese real estate sector remained negative. More non-state-owned real estate developers have fallen into liquidity crises, leading to defaults on their bonds or the need to offer an extension proposal for bondholders.
At the moment, the default rate (actual default plus technical default) of Chinese real estate USD bonds has risen to over 70%. Under this unprecedented situation, most Chinese real estate bond investors should be worried and frightened.
It is worth emphasizing that even if bonds have defaulted, bondholders are not left with nothing. In general, there are two kinds of scenarios following bond defaults: a debt restructuring or a liquidation filed by creditors.
In the past, there were many cases where companies successfully paid off the interests and a large portion of the bond principal after undergoing a debt restructuring. Also, given the current low bond prices of some developers, there are some opportunities for their bonds to rebound.
Nonetheless, investors should understand that debt restructuring or liquidation usually takes a long time (at least one year or more). It is no guarantee that the company’s internal assets can be sold at a reasonable price or market value. Besides, a game theory from different parties applies and will result in high uncertainty in the final recovery value of the defaulted bonds. In addition, the bonds' liquidity can be low and volatility can be high. Investors have to pay attention to these points before investing.
Below, we have compiled a list of the latest developments and bond prices for 30 mainstream non-state-owned real estate developers, as well as our team’s latest commentaries. This table will be updated continuously for investors’ reference (recommend to read via web version) (bold content as the latest update):
Table 1: List of 30 Chinese Real Estate Developers (Categorized by Sales Size)
(Large Chinese Real Estate Developers)
| Company (Blue Font is the Latest Update, if any) | Latest Development | Commentary |
| Evergrande | - Evergrande has officially entered a forced liquidation, and Alvarez & Marsal is the liquidator to handle the asset disposal. Capability of liquidator is key to max recovery value for debtholders. Liquidators have experience in Lehman Brother and Luckin Coffee. - According to Bloomberg, Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission has reached an agreement with PwC HK under which the firm has agreed to set aside HKD1 billion to compensate eligible independent minority shareholders of Evergrande. Evergrande’s liquidators will face PwC in court on May 18 to determine if the lawsuit over audit negligence and fund recovery can proceed. | -The SFC's legal actions against PwC is a separate lawsuit from the liquidator's. The compensation will bypass the liquidation waterfall and is paid to minority shareholders directly. It may not be positive to creditors as PwC's ability to pay is finite, and this agreement also shows that they want to settle the regulatory front first. -The liquidation process is still ongoing, and we posit that it will take a couple of years to complete due to its scale. |
| Scenery Journey | ||
| Vanke | - Vanke proposed an extension for its RMB 2 billion onshore bond due in May, offering to repay 40% of principal immediately with the remainder extended for one year; the proposal has been approved by bondholders, temporarily easing short-term default pressure. - Vanke sold 99.41% equity in its pig farming business Huanshan for RMB 3.27 billion via open tender in April. - On 26 November 2025, Vanke announced that it was seeking to postpone the repayment of RMB 2 billion loan maturing on 15 December 2025. The price of onshore and offshore bonds issued by the company plunged immediately after the news. It is reported that Vanke attempted to obtain short-term loans from two Chinese banks to repay a total of RMB 5.7 billion bonds maturing in December, but both requests are being rejected. - The company announced on 2 November that it had signed a framework agreement with its largest shareholder, Shenzhen Metro Group. Under this agreement, from start of 2025 until the company’s annual general shareholder meeting for the current year (expected to be in June 2026), Shenzhen Metro Group will provide the company with a loan facility of up to RMB 22 billion. | - Although Vanke’s largest shareholder, Shenzhen Metro, has repeatedly injected liquidity and provided shareholder loans, its parent company Shenzhen SASAC has also coordinated financing arrangements with financial institutions, the company’s operating performance remains weak and liquidity has tightened. Vanke’s failure to secure short‑term loans and its request for repayment extensions highlight that the existing support may still be insufficient to cover its debt obligations. |
| Country Garden | - Country Garden’s contracted sales attributable to equity in March 2026 was approximately RMB 2.2 billion, decreased by 30.5% YoY. As of December 2025, company held cash of RMB 18.6 billion (including RMB 12.8 billion in restricted cash). - Country Garden’s offshore debt restructuring plan became effective on 30 December 2025, covering approximately USD17.7 billion of debt with a total debt reduction of about US$11.7 billion; the Group has paid the first cash consideration of nearly US$400 million (around 2% of total principal). - The Group announced an update on the status of the offshore debt restructuring, the restructuring options and key terms, which include cash (at least 90% principal reduction), 100% principal conversion into mandatory convertible bonds, 67% principal conversion into mandatory convertible bonds with new debt instruments, 9.5-year new debt instruments (35% principal reduction) and 11.5-year new debt instruments (no principal reduction). The Group did not reach any offshore restructuring agreement before the self-imposed deadline (end-Feb). | - Country Garden already entered the stage of offshore debt defaults, but it is still actively disposing its assets to repay its onshore bonds. Its liquidity might be better than the defaulted peers. - The company’s onshore operations remain normal, and both the major shareholder and management have not abandoned it. The company has already launched its offshore debt restructuring plan. |
| Sunac | - Sunac recorded total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 36.8 billion, decreased by 21.8% YoY. - Sunac’s offshore debt restructuring became effective on 23 December 2025; approximately US$9.6 billion of existing offshore debt has been fully discharged and extinguished in exchange for mandatory convertible bonds, successfully resolving offshore debt risk, with the Hong Kong High Court dismissing the winding-up petition. - Sunac’s offshore debt restructuring plan involving approximately USD 9.6 billion was formally approved by the Hong Kong High Court on 5 November. With both onshore and offshore restructurings successfully completed, the company’s total debt is expected to decrease by nearly RMB 60 billion. | - Sunac has completed its offshore debt restructuring, converting approximately USD 9.6 billion of existing debt entirely into equity. This marks the first case in China’s property sector where offshore debt has been resolved through a full debt‑to‑equity swap. - The restructuring plan is not favorable for bondholders who wish to keep holding bonds and avoid receiving shares. However, given that the conversion price of the mandatory convertible bonds is not far above the current stock price, the overall quality of the restructuring plan compares well with industry peers. |
| Shimao | - Shimao’s recorded total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 24.0 billion, decreased by 29.6% YoY. - Shimao’s offshore debt restructuring plan became effective on 21 July 2025, discharging approximately US$11.5 billion principal plus accrued interest in exchange for new debt instruments of US$8 billion (6-8.5 years) and mandatory convertible bonds of US$4.5 billion (1 year); the Group also successfully extended approximately RMB 23.8 billion of onshore loans, with the longest extension to 2035. - UOB extended an HKD 10 billion loan to Shimao for another three years. The loan is collateralised by Shimao’s luxury property BEACON PEAK at Beacon Hill, which had sold only 17% of its units as of September. - In early 2025, the Longgang District government of Shenzhen approved the proposed acquisition of 12 land parcels at the Shenzhen–Hong Kong Integrated Development Project in eastern Shenzhen for RMB 6.8 billion. Shimao purchased the land in 2017 for nearly RMB 24 billion and planned to develop it into a complex including exhibition halls, a performance centre, and hotels, but construction was halted due to its 2022 debt crisis. - Shimao announced an offshore debt restructuring plan, providing four options, including a fixed combination of Option 4 or free allocation of Option 1 to Option 3. Option 1 is Short-term Loan / Bond, with a tenor of four to six years and 50% principal haircut. Option 2 is Long-term Loan / Bond, with a tenor of seven to nine years and no haircut. Option 3 is Mandatory Convertible Bond, with conversion price of HKD 6 into Shimao Group shares. Around 95.4% of scheme claims voted in favour of the plan. | -Shimao’s offshore debt restructuring plan became effective on 21 July 2025. |
| Longfor | - Longfor’s recorded total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 63.2 billion, decreased by 37.5% YoY. - In April 2026, Fitch revised Longfor’s “BB-” rating outlook from negative to stable, with Moody’s and S&P also affirming stable outlooks. - On 29 August 2025, Longfor declared an interim cash dividend of RMB 0.07 per share. | - Longfor's adjusted cash to short-term debt is 1.57 times. It has a large portion of rental revenues, together with over 10 billion cash inflows from the PBoC relaxing CRE loan uses, reflecting its liquidity is stronger than the peers. - As the industry outlook is still unclear, with a poor sales figure, its longer-term bonds are still subject to higher credit risks. |
| Seazen | - Seazen total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 3.0 billion, decreased by 37.5% YoY. - Seazen issued USD 355 million new bonds in February at 11.80% coupon for bond repurchase and debt repayment, and launched a tender offer for its 2026 and 2027 guaranteed senior notes totaling US$564 million. - New Metro Global Limited, a subsidiary of Seazen Group, plans to issue US$160 million 11.88% secured senior notes due in 2027 in September 2025. | – Although Seazen has successfully issued new bonds, which helps improve short‑term liquidity, the prolonged weakness in industry sales means its medium‑ to long‑term bonds still carry significant credit risks. |
| CIFI | - CIFI’s total contracted sales in March 2026 was approximately RMB 1.1 billion, decreased by 43.1% YoY. - CIFI’s offshore debt restructuring became effective on 29 December 2025, issuing USD 1.63 billion bonds, USD 1.02 billion loans and USD 4.08 billion mandatory convertible bonds to creditors. - In early 2026, CIFI sold 100% equity in Tianjin Hexin for RMB 302 million and acquired 50% equity in Haishu Xingli for the same amount via set-off; additionally sold 50% equity in Luoyang Zhuofa and related shareholder loans for RMB 105 million. | - CIFI’s offshore debt restructuring became effective on 29 December 2025. - Option One: Involves about 70% reduction in principal, but has the shortest term, making it suitable for creditors who have reservations about CIFI's ability to repay. - Option Two: Mostly consists of mandatory convertible bonds, thus having significant uncertainty in actual returns, suitable for creditors confident in CIFI's stock performance. - Option Three (bond form) and Option Five (loan form): No reduction in principal. - Option Four: Involves about 50% reduction in principal, but is not affected by stock price uncertainty, can be considered an alternative to Option 2B. - As each option has its own advantages and disadvantages, and over-subscription might lead to allocation to Option 2B or Five, bondholders might consider choosing multiple options (One to Four) simultaneously to reduce the risk of choosing the wrong option. |
| Zhongliang | - Zhongliang’s total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 12.1 billion, decreased by 32.7% YoY. - Zhongliang continued negotiating with creditors for loan extensions and has successfully extended approximately RMB 200 million loans to 2027. - On May 28, Zhongliang announced a solicitation of consent to amend certain bond terms, primarily lowering the coupon rate and extending the maturity date and mandatory redemption schedule by two years. | - Zhongliang has completed its offshore debt restructuring, which has been approved by the court. The plan did not involve major amendments to existing terms or any debt‑to‑equity swap, making it better than the restructuring schemes of other developers. - That said, the extension period is only two years. If the Chinese property sector remains sluggish, the company may struggle to make cash repayments when due and could be forced into another round of extensions. |
| Zhenro | - Zhenro’s total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 0.96 billion, decreased by 14.6% YoY. - Zhenro is exploring the announcement of a revised restructuring plan on 30 June 2026; no material progress has been made on the restructuring plan so far. - Zhenro Properties’ large shareholder, Mr. OU Zongrong, was subject to constraint measures due to his alleged breach of laws involving criminal offence. - The British Virgin Islands court held a hearing to apply for the appointment of a liquidator for RoYue, which is wholly owned by the major shareholder, Mr. Ou Zongrong and holds approximately 43.3% of Zhenro's shares. | - Zhenro has withdrawn its original restructuring plan and intends to propose a new one, while repeatedly delaying negotiations with creditors on the revised arrangement. As the industry recovery has fallen short of expectations, the previous plan without principal haircuts has become difficult to implement. We expect the new restructuring plan is more likely to involve substantial principal reductions and could be of lower quality. - Going forward, RoYue's liquidator may seek a third party to sell off its shares in Zhenro Properties. Referencing the cases of Jiayuan International (which was liquidated) and Jiayuan Services, this could potentially lead to a change in the major shareholder of Zhenro Properties, with the new major shareholder possibly taking a more proactive approach to handling the debt. |
| Logan | - Logan’s total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 4.8 billion, decreased by 33.4% YoY. - In March 2026, Logan applied to the court for a hearing on its restructuring proposal and reached agreement with the creditor committee to extend the support period to 31 March 2027. - Logan Group announced its domestic debt restructuring plan, involving a principal amount of approximately RMB 22.0 billion. The Group offers five options: 1) cash payment, 2) debt-for-asset swap, 3) mandatory convertible bonds, 4) specific assets, and 5) full extension of debt. - Logan Group announced that the restructuring plans for 21 domestic corporate bonds and asset-backed securities (ABS) issued by its wholly-owned subsidiary, Shenzhen Logan Holdings Co., Ltd., have all been approved by the relevant bondholders' meetings. | -We believe that the proposed restructuring plan lacks sincerity. The options provided are worse than the original plan. More importantly, the maximum issuance amounts for Option 1 and Option 4 are only 10% and 8% of the total principal, respectively. This means the company actually restricts bondholders from converting all their claims into new long-term bonds (Option 4) or receiving immediate cash (Option 1). Instead, it forces them into options with principal reductions or stock-related instruments (Options 2 and 3), which account for 82% of the total principal. Therefore, we believe creditors should consider opposing this restructuring plan. -If offshore creditors unite to reject this plan, the company may be forced to present a better restructuring proposal or creditors may seek a court liquidation order, putting the company into liquidation (worst-case scenario). Given that the company still has several offshore projects, creditors have a chance to recover part of the principal. Therefore, compared to being forced to accept this plan, we believe opposing it might offer creditors better benefits. -if the restructuring plan is approved, creditors can still choose from the different options within the plan. The cost of not joining is only the consent fee (0.125% or 0.05%). |
| Greentown | - Greentown’s total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 38.6 billion, decreased by 26.3% YoY. - In July 2025, Greentown acquired a plot of land in Shuanghu, Suzhou Industrial Park for 4.67 billion yuan, setting a new record for the highest floor price per square meter in Jiangsu Province. - In July 2025, Greentown spent 6.47 billion yuan to acquire a plot of land in the North Waitan area, setting a new record for the highest floor price in Shanghai's land market. | - Greentown’s current operating condition remains stable, and it has successfully advanced offshore debt refinancing. Its SOE background may also help the company secure financing, making its credit risk relatively manageable compared with peers. - However, taking Vanke’s recent case as a reference, if industry sales continue to be sluggish, the existing support may still prove insufficient to sustain Greentown’s debt repayments. |
(Mid-sized Chinese Real Estate Developers)
| Company | Latest Development | Commentary |
| Agile | - Agile’s recorded total contracted sales in March 2026 was approximately RMB 670 million, decreased by 43% YoY. - Agile’s offshore debt restructuring is still in progress, with the Hong Kong High Court adjourning the winding-up petition hearing to 29 June 2026. - In April, Agile sold 50% interest in a Zhejiang commercial-residential project for RMB 95 million (settled by debt transfer); in March, sold certain operating fixed assets for RMB 1.15 billion to repay related debts. - Between 29 April and 30 September 2025, Agile reached preliminary agreements with various financial institutions to extend repayments total of RMB 1.49 billion. - On 30 September, Agile announced that it had submitted an initial offshore debt restructuring proposal to major offshore creditors and aims to reach agreements with most creditors by the end of 2025. | - The company has hired external financial advisors to carry out offshore debt restructuring and is expected to make further progress. |
| KWG | - KWG’s recorded total contracted sales in March 2026 was approximately RMB 352 million, decreased by 43% YoY. - KWG reached an in-principal agreement with major offshore creditors (representing over 26% of outstanding principal) on a USD 4.66 billion debt restructuring scheme, backed by the Ap Lei Chau project in Hong Kong Island; the High Court has further adjourned the hearing to 22 June 2026. - On 11 November, the HKEX issued a disciplinary statement reprimanding six current directors and one former company secretary for a 16-month delay in issuing circulars for two major transactions in 2023. - On March 7, KWG proposed an offshore debt restructuring framework that includes options such as cash, bonds, or mandatory convertible bonds. | - The company has appointed Alvarez & Marsal as its financial advisor to assist with the restructuring of its offshore debt and already reached in principle agreement with major offshore creditors. |
| Ronshine | - Ronshine’s recorded total contracted sales in 1Q 2026 was approximately RMB 280 million, decreased by 39% YoY. - Market sources reported that Ronshine failed to launch its planned onshore debt restructuring proposal in October and intends to conduct another voting process to seek an extension for the relevant bonds. | - Investors might pay attention to the company's follow-up actions, especially whether it would arrange a restructuring for USD bonds. |
| R&F | - R&F’s recorded total contracted sales in 1Q 2026 was approximately RMB 2.9 billion, increased by 5% YoY. - In April 2026, R&F’s offshore restructuring has obtained support from over 77% of creditors, targeting completion within 2026. - On 11 November, R&F announced that an onshore bond worth approximately RMB 1.68 billion had obtained approval for a restructuring plan. - R&F announced its offshore debt restructuring plan. The options include (1) Upfront Cash, (2) New Senior Bond and Mandatory Convertible Bond, and (3) New Long-Term Bond. | - Option 1: It allows for immediate receipt of cash (5% of the principal), with very low uncertainty, making it more suitable for creditors with big concerns about the company's future debt repayment ability. However, creditors must accept a significant reduction of up to 95% of the principal. The other two options are more preferable compared to Option 1. - Option 2: While involving a principal haircut of around 50% to 60%, in theory, New Senior Bond has a higher priority for debt repayment compared to New Long-term Bond, resulting in lower default risk than the new long-term bond. The portion of mandatory convertible bonds can be immediately converted into R&F’s new shares, which could be sold on the stock market. This part potentially recovers around 3% of the principal, already close to the immediate receipt of cash from Option 1, making this option more appealing compared to Option 1. - Option 3: It involves no principal haircut but comes with an exceptionally long term, with cash recovery expected to start gradually from the seventh year after the RED from coupon payments. It is more suitable for creditors who prefer to avoid haircut. This option has certain advantages, allowing investors to reinstate full principal amount to get repaid over a longer period of time. |
| Kaisa | - Kaisa's recorded total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 5.5 billion, decreased by 18% YoY. - Kaisa announced on 17 March 2026 that the consent solicitation for offshore notes has been completed and the supplemental deed executed; the Group raised the consent fee to approximately 1% of the minimum cash interest and lowered the share issuance price for interest payment from HKD 0.5 to HKD 0.3 per share. - Kaisa initiated a consent solicitation on December 4, seeking approval to use shares to pay the minimum cash interest on six bonds. This interest was originally due on December 28 of this year, and on June 28 and December 28 of next year. - Kaisa announced its offshore debt restructuring plan, whereby the restructuring consideration to the creditors will consist of (i) 6 tranches of USD senior new notes and (ii) 8 tranches of mandatory convertible USD bonds convertible into new shares of the Company, which are to be allocated pro rata based on the pro rata portion of the amount of the claims to which the creditors of the Kaisa or Shui King Plan. The Group's court hearing will be held in mid-March. The winding-up petition hearing against Kaisa has been further postponed to 31st March next year. On 15 September, Kaisa announced that all conditions for its offshore restructuring plan had been satisfied and the plan had become fully effective, reducing debt by approximately USD 8.6 billion and extending maturities by an average of five years. | - The plan is considered acceptable. For USD bondholders, as creditors can participate in both plans (Rui Jing and Kaisa Proposed Restructuring Plan) simultaneously, there is no principal haircut. - We believe that the USD bondholders can accept the plan. Given the holders willing to wait, the cash proceeds from the new bond repayment and the liquidation value of the shares after converting the mandatory convertible bonds would be higher than directly selling the bond in the open market. |
| Aoyuan | - Aoyuan recorded total contracted sales of approximately RMB 7.3 billion in 2025. - Aoyuan failed to pay interest due on 30 March 2026 within the 30-day grace period, constituting an event of default and triggering cross-default on other offshore financings; the Group has suspended payment of all due or upcoming principal and interest on offshore debts. - In March, Aoyuan exercised its discretion to extend the holding period under the China Aoyuan Plan and Add Hero Plan by six months to 22 September 2026. - On 30 September 2025, the company announced that onshore financing totalling approximately RMB 1.1 billion had been extended, and it had reached settlements for eight litigation cases involving outstanding debts. | - While Aoyuan's debt restructuring plan is of fair quality, the plan is quite sincere. The major shareholder gives up some of his shares and USD bonds, and the company put all offshore assets and a few onshore assets for credit enhancement. However, the company's solvency is still weak. It is less likely that the company could repay the first round of principal repayment. |
| Redsun | - Redsun’s recorded total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 4.3 billion, decreased by 62% YoY. - The Hong Kong High Court approved further adjournment of the winding-up petition hearing to 5 October 2026. - Redsun extended the early consent and base restructuring support agreement fees deadline to 22 May and 5 June respectively. - On 14 November 2025, the company exercised its discretion to extend the early consent fee deadline under its restructuring support agreement from 14 November to 12 December 2025, and extended the base RSA fee deadline from 28 November to 29 December 2025. - In the first three quarters of 2025, the company completed extensions or repayment slowdowns for 11 loans totalling approximately RMB 3.1 billion, and secured two new financing facilities totalling approximately RMB 90 million. | - Redsun's restructuring plan is considered one of the worst among Chinese property developers. Creditors are not only left without any options but are also forced to accept a principal reduction of up to 77%. The terms of the plan are extremely harsh. |
| Powerlong | - Powerlong’s total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 1.6 billion, decreased by 22.3% YoY. - Powerlong’s restructuring plan has received support from over 85.48% of bondholders; creditors may vote on plan options before 4 May 2026, and the winding-up petition against a subsidiary has been withdrawn. - In January, Powerlong sold 25% equity in Powerlong Commercial (160.7 million shares) for RMB 361 million cash. - In November 2025, Powerlong Real Estate announced that the hearing for the winding-up application of its subsidiary, Powerlong Real Estate (BVI), had been postponed to December 15. This further postponement aims to provide the company and its subsidiaries with additional time to discuss and enter into a restructuring support agreement with the company's offshore creditors. | - Powerlong’s restructuring plan has received support from over 85.5% of bondholders, and the winding-up petition against a subsidiary has been withdrawn. |
| Yuzhou | - Yuzhou’s total contracted sales in 1Q 2026 was approximately RMB 1.4 billion, decreased by 29% YoY - Yuzhou has revised its restructuring plan to include existing company loans, while other economic terms remain largely unchanged. Creditors have three options: converting their debt into various new US dollar bonds and/or newly issued ordinary shares of Yuzhou. - Under this restructuring plan, the company needs to obtain approval for the Hong Kong scheme under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, conduct a rights issue (at a ratio of 49 new shares for every 100 existing shares at HK$0.035 per share), and issue 5.645 billion new shares to creditors at HK$2.127 per share. Upon completion of these actions, the company intends to consolidate 10 shares into 1 share. The rights issue, issuance of new shares, and share consolidation have been approved by shareholders. | - Yuzhou's restructuring plan is reasonably sincere, involving cash payments and installment payments, as well as raising funds through a rights issue. The plan also includes strong credit enhancement measures. - The swift approval of Yuzhou's restructuring plan reflects its strong execution capability. - Yuzhou expects to raise up to approximately 110 million RMB through the rights issue, which will be sufficient to cover the cash portion of 24.74 million USD for the short-term bond options in the restructuring plan and the consent fees, helping to alleviate the company's debt burden. |
| Times China | - Times China’s total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 0.8 billion, decreased by 29% YoY. - Times China’s offshore debt restructuring plan became effective on 28 November 2025. - In April, the Group entered into a debt offset agreement to transfer residential units and car parks in Zhaoqing for RMB 6.295 million to settle outstanding payables. - Earlier on 2024 November 22, Times China announced its formal offshore debt restructuring plan, which includes the following options: (1) upfront cash, short-term bonds, and new company shares, (2) mandatory convertible bonds I and medium-term bonds, (3) long-term bonds. The accrued and unpaid interest will be distributed in the form of mandatory convertible bonds II. | - Due to the low current stock price and high conversion price, which is one of the highest among all restructuring plans for Chinese property developers, the indirect reduction from debt-to-equity conversion is substantial but allows investors to cash out quickly. Short, medium, and long-term bonds involve credit risks; the longer the term, the higher the risk of default. - Option 1, with short-term bonds, has payment priority. If the company can successfully repay the bonds, the recovery rate will exceed 30%. Investors who are eager to recover their principal and do not mind a reduction can choose Option 1. - Option 2 is the choice most people will be allocated to. If the company's stock price is not expected to rebound in the short term (within 1.5 years after the effective date), the mandatory convertible bonds in Option 2 will not significantly increase the recovery value. In comparison, Option 2's medium-term bonds are only 1-3 years shorter than Option 3's long-term bonds but have a recovery value about 55% lower. If the company can restructure and resume operations, both bonds with similar terms are likely to be repaid. Therefore, investors confident in Times China and the Chinese real estate market should prioritize Option 3. |
| Sino-ocean | - Sino-ocean’s total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 3.0 billion, decreased by 42% YoY. - In March, Sino-Ocean acquired 191 car parks in mainland China from its controlling shareholder for RMB 31.33 million via debt offset. - The Courts already approved the offshore debt restructuring plan, which would restructure USD 5.6 billion of offshore debt into USD 2.2 billion of new debt at an interest rate of 3%, with the remaining debt to be converted into mandatory convertible bonds or new perpetual securities. - Sino-ocean has met all the conditions of its restructuring plan, with the effective date 27th March. | - The restructuring plan of Sino-ocean lacks sincerity, and it is clearly tilted in favor of syndicated loan holders, which is obviously unfavorable to bondholders (especially those classified under Group C debt). - The indirect principal reduction for holders of Group B and Group C debt is approximately 64% and 85%, respectively, which is higher than the restructuring plans of other peers who have defaulted. The coupon rate for the new perpetual bonds is as low as 1%, and they are subject to selective payment with low priority in debt repayment. The core "new debt" of the restructuring plan has an overall term of 8 or 10 years, with a very small amount recoverable. - Theoretically, a poorer restructuring plan may result in a higher possibility of repaying the restructured debt in the future. |
| China SCE | - China SCE’s total contracted sales in 2025 was approximately RMB 43.4 billion, decreased by 35.4% YoY. - China SCE made significant progress on its offshore debt restructuring, issuing a notice on 27 April for the plan meeting to be held on 18 May 2026 for creditors to vote; the plan includes mandatory convertible bonds, new shares and new notes, together with a proposed increase in authorised share capital. - China SCE's wholly-owned subsidiary, Affluent Way International Limited, was subject to a winding-up petition in the Virgin Islands Court, with outstanding senior bonds totaling approximately US$13.4 million. On June 23, local time, the Virgin Islands Court granted the dismissal of the winding-up petition. - China SCE announced that scheme creditors holding approximately 83% of the outstanding principal amount of existing notes and 66% of the outstanding principal amount of related debts have joined or provided instructions to join the restructuring support agreement. | - Regarding the restructuring framework, the terms proposed by China SCE are comparatively favorable. The long-term options have shorter tenors compared to peers, and the conversion price is one of the lowest among Chinese property developers, tentatively set at HKD 1.75 per share. The company has already disclosed more details of the restructuring plan and obtained creditor support, with the scheme now progressing step by step. |
(Small Chinese Real Estate Developers)
| Company | Latest Development | Commentary |
| Fantasia | - Fantasia recorded total contracted sales of approximately RMB 59 million in the first two months of 2026. - On 3 October, the company announced that approximately 85% of bondholders, representing about 77% of outstanding principal, had formally signed or validly acceded to its offshore restructuring support agreement. | - Overall, the new plan is a significant downgrade to the original plan. However, bondholders can still replace approximately 70% of their debts into new bonds after the completion of debt-to-conversion, which the haircut percentage is not bad compared to the plans from other property developers. |
| Redco | - Redco recorded total contracted sales of approximately RMB 78 million in the first 2 months of 2025. - Redco transferred car parks, residential and retail units to its 75%-owned subsidiary Redco Healthy Living for a total consideration of RMB 159 million to offset outstanding refundable deposits and service fees. - In the first three quarters of 2025, the company extended onshore loans totalling approximately RMB 3.2 billion, with certain maturities extended to as late as 2028. | - Based on our news, Haitong International, which the company appointed as its financial advisor, dropped out of contact with the company. - However, Redco has been diligently submitting multiple performance reports and has successfully resumed trading. The company is sincerely committed to improving its situation, and the resumption of trading will facilitate the early submission of a debt restructuring plan. |
| Central China | - Central China’s total contracted sales in Q1 2026 was approximately RMB 1.6 billion, decreased by 23.3% YoY. - Wang Jun, Vice Chairman of Central China, mentioned in mid-November last year that Central China Real Estate’s offshore debt restructuring plan is in progress. They had several rounds of communication with major creditors, on the basis of which a preliminary proposal has been formed. More information and progress of the restructuring will be provided soon. - Central China issued a notice stating that, in response to the company's interim report for the period ending June 2025, it provided a business update on the actions taken regarding certain action measures, including: submitting an updated cash flow model and framework restructuring plan to creditors and continuing to actively communicate with creditors; renewing or extending borrowings and additional financing obtained; and actively seeking to resolve pending group litigation and continuing to closely monitor loans that are due. | - Central China is the first developer with an SOE background to fall into an actual default, fully reflecting the extremely depressed state of the industry. The company has already begun formulating and advancing a debt restructuring plan. |
| Sinic | - In August, the company received a petition for winding up against the Company about a private bond, which was filed in the High Court of Hong Kong. The hearing was adjourned to 7 December 2022. The High Court of Hong Kong issued a winding up order against Sinic Holdings. The company's creditors appointed Kroll as the company liquidator. - Kroll informed creditors that the liquidation of Li Yue (a key offshore subsidiary of Sinic) has been hindered by delays from FTI Consulting (its directors and receivers). Despite repeated urgings from the liquidator, as of February 14, 2025, Li Yue has not initiated a creditors' voluntary liquidation (CVL), with FTI being criticized for failing to promptly realize assets and for having a conflict of interest. Kroll proposes taking over Li Yue’s liquidation to leverage existing investigation findings for faster asset recovery and to use broader powers to trace fund flows and investigate subsidiaries, while seeking court approval to file a winding-up petition against Li Yue to move the process forward. | - Sinic's bonds are the lowest amongst Chinese real estate bonds. This reflects the market expects a low recovery value of its bonds. - The winding up order was issued by Court of Hong Kong, which means investors might get back a very small amount of principal after liquidation. But the liquidation process might take long time. |
| Jiayuan | - Jiayuan International received a petition for winding up against the Company filed in the High Court of Hong Kong. The High Court of Hong Kong issued a winding up order against Jiayuan International. The company's creditors appointed PwC as the company liquidator. - Jiayuan announced that due to insufficient creditors to support the restructuring plan, slowing sales and lack of new capital, the investors do not intend to sign the loan agreement and the terms and conditions have lapsed on 7 July, 2024. - Jiayuan International did not review the Stock Exchange's decision to cancel its listing status and was officially delisted on October 29. | - The Hong Kong court issued a winding up order, but the company's liquidator might cooperate with different parties to come up with a restructuring plan. The uncertainty remains high, with significant variables. - The company shares were delisted. The investor who intends to provide funding already withdraws his funding. As such, it is difficult for the company to undergo debt restructuring, increasing the possibility of compulsory liquidation. |
| Roadking | - Roadking's total property sales for the year 2025 were RMB 7.3 billion; toll revenue and average daily mixed traffic volume for its highway projects were HKD 1.7 billion and 87,300 vehicles respectively. - Roadking reached an in-principal restructuring agreement in principle with a significant portion of creditors (including the major creditor group holding ~25% of bonds) in March and the hearing of the related winding-up petition has been adjourned to no earlier than 8 June 2026; however, creditor opinions have since diverged, with holders of ~10% of bonds hoping to form a new AHG and intending to pursue winding-up. - The proposed in-principal restructuring consists of the “New Selection Plan” and “Road King Plan”. Under the “New Selection Plan”, creditors will receive convertible bonds issued by a special purpose vehicle which will hold 70% equity interest in Road King Expressway International Holdings Limited upon the restructuring effective date, with assets including four toll roads in Indonesia. Under the “Road King Plan”, creditors have two options: (1) convert 10% of their debt into cash, or (2) receive a 6-year medium-term bond equivalent to 13% of the principal with a 3% coupon, together with ordinary shares equivalent to 34% of the principal at a conversion price of HKD 5.6 per share. - In April 2026, Roadking, together with joint sellers, sold an aggregate 80% equity interest in Shanghai Junxin Real Estate to the existing shareholders of the target company for a total consideration of RMB 116.4 million; as Roadking holds 65% of the target, RoadKing will realise approximately RMB 94.4 million of proceeds. - In August 2025, Roadking announced to ensure fair and equitable treatment of all offshore creditors, it decided to suspend payments of all due principal and interest on offshore bank debts, notes, and perpetual securities, and to proceed with the sale of its Indonesian toll roads. | - “New Select Scheme”: Road King is effectively handing over its core infrastructure asset – a 70% stake in RKE – to creditors as debt settlement, giving creditors control over both the asset and the disposal process, while Road King steps back into a supporting role and can only earn a performance fee if the sale price is high enough. Assuming RKE is eventually sold for USD 600 million, creditors would receive USD 420 million (70%), which, when allocated across all bondholders (including fixed-term and perpetual notes, see Appendix), would translate into roughly 18% recovery of principal. On the positive side, creditors are receiving a more tangible asset in the form of a 70% equity stake in RKE; however, from another perspective, Road King effectively transfers the execution risk of monetising the asset to the creditors. Given that Road King has spent the past year seeking buyers without success and sector conditions for infrastructure assets have deteriorated, there is significant uncertainty over the eventual sale price and timing for this 70% stake. If a sale ultimately cannot be completed, creditors may be forced to remain as shareholders, holding the equity rather than recovering their claims in cash. - “Road King Scheme”: Marked to Road King’s current share price, both options under the Road King Scheme imply low recovery and deep principal haircuts: Option 1 (cash) yields around 10% of principal, while Option 2 (mid‑term bond + equity) yields only about 16.8% of principal on current prices. At the same time, management has sharply revised down the expected onshore cash flow available for offshore use from RMB 3.0–3.6 billion to RMB 1.8–2.2 billion, highlighting further deterioration in Road King’s operating environment amid a weak domestic property market. Despite the terms are far from favourable, the company has indicated that a substantial proportion of creditors have already expressed support for this preliminary restructuring framework, and if the final restructuring plan secures 75% or more creditor approval, it will be formally implemented and become legally binding on all creditors. |
Sources: Internet Resources, Company's Announcement, FSMOne
Data as of 4 December 2025
Declaration: For specific disclosure, at the time of publication of this report, IFPL (via its connected and associated entities) holds positions in COGARD 1.250% 31Dec2036 Corp (USD), COGARD 2.250% 31Dec2034 Corp (USD) ,COGARD ZERO 31Dec2034 Corp (USD), REDPRO 10.500% 06Jan2023 Corp (CNH), FTHDGR 6.950% 17Dec2021 Corp (USD), FTHDGR 7.950% 05Jul2022 Corp (USD), EVERRE 8.250% 23Mar2022 Corp (USD) and the analyst who produced this report holds a NIL position in the abovementioned securities.
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