Credit Update: Attractive 6+% USD/GBP bonds offered by Rothesay (GIC-owned)

Underlying earnings recovered strongly in 1H26 on a rebound in new business, and solvency remains well above target even after a large special dividend. We maintain our preference for Rothesay’s credit profile and bonds.

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Published on 09 Oct 2026
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We previously initiated coverage on Rothesay’s bonds earlier this year: Idea of the week: Attractive 5+% to 7+% GBP & USD bonds offered by Rothesay (GIC owned)

Since then, Rothesay has released its half-year results for the six months ending 30 June 2026 (1H26), for both the group, Rothesay Limited (RL), and the bond issuer, Rothesay Life Plc (RLP). In this article, we examine the latest results and provide our updated view on the bonds. Figures are for RL unless stated; RLP’s numbers closely align with the issuer (Rothesay Life PLC).

1. Underlying earnings rebounded on robust new business premiums

• New business recovered sharply after a deliberately light FY25. Rothesay wrote £2.8b of new business premiums (APM) across 16 pension schemes (1H25: £0.3b), already 54% of FY25’s full-year £5.2b, and management describes the pipeline as strong. However, added insurer capacity has made the market more competitive, though management says it has kept pricing discipline. We note that any margin squeeze would reduce the flow-through of APM to earnings, which could slightly moderate Rothesay’s earnings capacity. Nevertheless, we do not think this would materially impact the group’s debt-servicing capability.

• Adjusted operating profit, our preferred earnings measure, rose 21.7% YoY to £410m (1H25: £337m). The in-force book (the pensions Rothesay has already insured) contributed a steady £341m (1H25: £339m) from investment returns and the release of reserves as policies run off. Future earnings from this book also look intact: the contractual service margin (CSM), a store of profit locked in on policies already written and released over their life, fell by just a net £7m (see Table 1 below), as new business additions broadly offset the release. Combined with the risk adjustment, it was flat at £4.8b, net of tax (FY25: £4.8b; standalone CSM not disclosed). As highlighted in our initiation, this recurring earnings stream anchors Rothesay’s credit profile even when APM is light, and its stability in 1H26 is encouraging for bondholders.

• Rothesay recorded a pre-tax loss of £(346)m (1H25: profit of £406m), driven by £674m of economic losses (see Table 1 below). By our estimate, roughly £361m came from higher long-term interest rates. Rothesay’s hedging targets its solvency position and economic value rather than accounting profit, so we treat this as accounting volatility rather than an impairment of debt-servicing capacity. The other £313m is different: a pre-emptive write-down on loans whose cash flows are linked to residential freehold properties, based on the draft Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Bill. These cash flows are largely ground rents paid by leaseholders to freeholders; by capping or reducing these rents, the bill would shrink the income that repays these loans, reducing their value. Depending on how the bill turns out, the eventual write-down could be larger or smaller than the £313m booked. While the final impact remains an item to monitor, we do not expect it to materially weigh on Rothesay’s credit profile, given the write-down equates to roughly 6% of its £4.9b surplus above the group’s solvency capital requirements (SCR).

• Overall, we view Rothesay’s 1H26 results as operationally solid. As seen in Table 1 below, the recurring earnings stream from the in-force book remained stable, while a rebound in new business profit lifted adjusted operating profit to £410m. Looking ahead, we expect a stable contribution from the in-force book, with new business offering potential upside given management’s strong pipeline outlook. Combined with the steady release of profits from its CSM, we expect Rothesay’s earnings capacity to remain well supported moving forward.

Table 1: A strong operating half, overwhelmed accounting loss by rate moves and a leasehold write-down


£m

1H26

FY25

1H25

New business profit

77

197

11

Performance of the in-force book

341

975

339

Non-economic assumption changes

18

(38)

(8)

Acquisition expenses

(26)

(95)

(5)

Adjusted operating profit before tax

410

1,039

337

Economic (losses)/gains

(674)

397

156

Borrowing costs

(89)

(170)

(85)

Decrease/(Increase) in Contractual Service Margin (CSM)

7

(61)

(22)

IFRS (loss)/profit before tax

(346)

1,205

406

Data as of 30 June 2026

Source: Company data, iFAST compilations.


2. Rothesay’s investment portfolio remains conservative and high in quality

• Assets under management rose 1.1% to £74.3b (FY25: £73.5b), and credit quality remains high. Over half of its rated assets are rated AAA or AA. Of the £26b of corporate and infrastructure bonds, only £0.6b (~2%) is rated BBB-; sub-investment-grade holdings fell to £18m (FY25: £30m), negligible against the £74.4b book. The asset mix also shifted towards higher-quality assets: cash, UK sovereigns, other sovereigns and supranational bonds rose to 42% of the portfolio (excluding derivatives). This matters as Rothesay uses financial derivatives to match its assets to its pension liabilities. When markets move sharply, it must post collateral to swap counterparties at short notice, and it uses these liquid holdings to meet those calls. Encouragingly, the liquid share rose when long-term rates went up, which suggests collateral needs were met without drawing down the buffer. Crucially for bondholders, this means Rothesay should not need to sell its illiquid secured loans in a hurry, which could crystallise losses and soften the credit profile.

• Secured lending remains conservatively underwritten. Mortgages and other secured lending held steady at 28% of financial assets (FY25: 28%; see Table 2 below). Lifetime mortgages (loans to over-55s with interest rolled up) rose 1.5% to £6.9b (FY25: £6.8b), while long-term fixed-rate mortgages fell 7.3% to £5.1b (FY25: £5.5b). New lifetime mortgages were written at an average loan-to-value of 28% (FY25: 29%), so house prices would need to fall by over 70% before a new loan exceeded the property's value, although rolled-up interest erodes this cushion over time. Do note that these assets are valued using internal models rather than market prices, so their values rest on Rothesay's own assumptions, a risk underlined by the £313m leasehold write-down.

• Looking ahead, we expect the portfolio to stay defensively positioned and high in quality, even if long-term rates rise further. Higher interest rates would trigger larger collateral calls on Rothesay’s swaps and weigh on its accounting profits. However, the group carries substantial buffers, including the 42% collateral buffer provided by its highly liquid assets of cash and sovereign bonds. These can be posted as collateral without forced sales, and its £5.0b solvency surplus leaves ample room to absorb losses. Its hedging programme also limits the solvency impact, as it matches assets to liabilities so that both move together when rates rise. On balance, we think Rothesay’s investment portfolio continues to be high-quality and conservatively managed.

Table 2: Liquid assets rose slightly as a share of the book


% of financial assets excl. derivatives

1H26

FY25

UK sovereign

22%

21%

Supranational, quasi-sovereign and other sovereigns

15%

13%

Cash

5%

6%

Corporate bonds

20%

22%

Infrastructure

10%

10%

Mortgages

14%

14%

Secured residential lending

7%

8%

Other secured lending

7%

6%

Data as of 30 June 2026

Source: Company data, iFAST compilations. Percentages read from the company’s charts and may not sum to 100% due to rounding.


3. Solid credit profile underpinned by healthy capital ratios and adequate liquidity

• Solvency remains strong even after the special dividend paid post 1H26. SCR coverage softened modestly to 235% (FY25: 246%) and 211% (pro-forma, post payout of special dividend). This slight decline is partially due to an increase in new business premiums*, alongside the swing to a pre-tax loss. We note that pro-forma SCR of 211% retains ample headroom above the regulatory requirement of 100% and comfortably above management’s target range of 140%-160%. Moving forward, management expects coverage to move closer to the target range as Rothesay underwrites more new business premiums.

*Writing new business premiums consumes capital in two ways: it increases the SCR, as more risk sits on Rothesay’s book, and it uses up the group’s own funds at the outset as reserves are set aside for the new liabilities. Both lower SCR coverage.

• Leverage metrics have elevated but remain healthy (see Table 3 below). Leverage (borrowings / eligible own funds) was 31.8% (FY25: 29.9%). Do note that this metric rises to 41.1% if we also count the £793m sterling Restricted Tier-1 (RT1) perpetuals, which are booked under equity. We prefer the latter figure and note that both leverage metrics rose compared to FY25 owing to reasons we covered above regarding SCR and pre-tax loss. Nevertheless, we remain comfortable with Rothesay’s leverage metrics.

• On the other hand, coverage has improved since our initiation. Interest coverage ratio ( TTM adjusted operating profit/ TTM borrowing costs) picked up to 6.4x compared to FY25’s 6.1x as earnings grew much faster than interest costs. This improvement strengthens Rothesay’s debt-servicing capacity and is a boon for bondholders.

• Liquidity appears adequate, although there are gaps in the interim data. As of 30 June 2026, Rothesay carries £301m in cash (FY25: £277m), which alone does not cover near-term obligations, including the £500m of Tier 2 notes due July 2026 and the interim and special dividends declared in August. That said, Rothesay can draw on its liquid assets (42% of financial assets in cash and sovereign bonds) and the £750m undrawn credit facility cited at our initiation. Hence, we see low near-term refinancing risk for Rothesay.

• Looking ahead, we expect Rothesay’s credit profile to remain healthy. That said, we expect SCR coverage to ease and leverage metrics to edge up as the group writes more business. Nevertheless, any anticipated softening should not materially weaken Rothesay’s credit profile. Finally, interest coverage should remain healthy, supported by steady in-force earnings.

Table 3: Solvency and leverage softened from very high levels; coverage has improved


Credit metrics

1H26

FY25

SCR coverage

235% (211% pro forma)

246%

Surplus above SCR (£m)

4,901

5,352

Interest coverage (adj. operating profit/borrowing costs)

6.4x (TTM)

6.1x

Leverage metric (borrowings / eligible own funds)

31.8%

29.9%

Leverage metric incl. RT1s (booked as equity)

41.1%

38.7%

Data as of 30 June 2026

Source: Company Data, iFast Compilations.


Recommendations

Table 4: GBP and USD bond recommendations 


Issue

Issuer

Ask Price

Yield to Worst (%) / Yield to next call (%)

Years to maturity / Call

Credit Rating (S&P / Moody’s / Fitch)

ROTHLF 7.000% 11Sep2034 Corp (USD)

Rothesay Life PLC

100.04

6.89% / 6.89%

7.93 / 2.67

- / Baa1 / BBB+

ROTHLF 7.019% 10Dec2034 Corp (GBP)

Rothesay Life PLC

100.04

6.89% / 6.89%

8.17 / 7.67

- / Baa1 / BBB+

ROTHLF 7.000% Perpetual Corp (USD)

Rothesay Life PLC

94.40

7.90% / 7.90%

- / 8.65

- / - / BBB

Data as of 9 October 2026

Source: Bloomberg, Bondsupermart, iFAST Compilations.


• Overall, we think Rothesay’s credit profile remains stable. New business premiums returning to growth, alongside the stability of its recurring earnings stream, have lifted adjusted operating profit. The investment portfolio remains conservatively managed, with an increasing tilt towards high-quality assets (cash and sovereign bonds). Although SCR coverage and leverage metrics have softened, they remain healthy, and we remain comfortable with Rothesay’s credit profile. Interest coverage has improved, which strengthens the group’s debt-servicing capability. Looking forward, while SCR and leverage metrics are expected to soften, we do not expect any material worsening in Rothesay’s credit profile.

• Do note that all three bonds of Rothesay we highlight in Table 4 above are subordinated and rank behind policyholders. The non-perpetual, Tier 2 bonds can defer coupons (on a cumulative basis) and suspend principal payment if Rothesay breaches its SCR or a payment would cause a breach (below 100% SCR). We view this risk as remote given a pro-forma 211% SCR coverage and a ~£4.9b surplus. Unlike bank Tier 2, insurer Tier 2 receives no regulatory capital amortisation ahead of maturity under Solvency II, meaning Rothesay has no capital-driven incentive to call early. Any call decision is therefore economic rather than regulatory, subject to PRA approval, and bonds should be assessed on their reset economics rather than assumed to be called at the first opportunity. Finally, its RT1 perpetuals carry fully discretionary, non-cumulative coupons and can be written down if SCR coverage falls below a predefined trigger (~75% of SCR). While remote at current capitalisation, this is the key risk RT1 investors are compensated for.

• As seen in Table 4 above, we highlight three of Rothesay’s outstanding bonds for consideration: the bullet bonds offer yields-to-worst of 6.89% (both USD and GBP), with 2.7 years and 7.7 years to call. Against comparable US Treasuries/UK Gilts, we find an attractive yield spread of 170+bps. We also highlight one outstanding perpetual: this USD issue provides a yield-to-worst of 7.90%, with 8.65 years to call.  We think these elevated yields and premiums partly reflect Rothesay’s status as a private company, which results in less frequent public disclosure compared to its public peers.

• On balance, we continue to like Rothesay’s GBP and USD bonds. Investors comfortable with lower reporting frequency can consider these outstanding bonds for their attractive yields, backed by Rothesay’s solid credit profile. 

 



Declaration: For specific disclosure, at the time of publication of this report, IFPL (via its connected and associated entities) holds ROTHLF 7.019% 10Dec2034 Corp (GBP) and the analyst who produced this report holds NIL positions in the abovementioned securities. This research report was prepared with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. iFAST Financial Pte Ltd does not rely exclusively on AI for content generation; the content of this report – including all investment theses, ratings, price targets and conclusions – has been independently reviewed and verified by the research analyst(s) to ensure accuracy and professional integrity.





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