Credit Update: Alibaba’s fortress balance sheet anchors its credit profile amid elevated AI spend

While Alibaba’s credit profile has softened amid intense price competition and elevated capex, we think its solid liquidity profile and regulatory measures to curb irrational competition should support its credit quality

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Published on 08 May 2026
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• Dominant local e-commerce business remains the bedrock of earnings and supports its credit quality

 
• Accelerating Cloud/AI growth, with scope for margin expansion, should improve earnings diversification

 
• Fortress balance sheet provides a buffer against increased capex spend, safeguarding the group’s creditworthiness through its current investment cycle

 
• Decent credit profile: low leverage and strong interest coverage continue to provide comfort for bondholders


About Alibaba

Alibaba is one of China’s largest technology conglomerates, operating across e-commerce, cloud computing, digital media, logistics, and international commerce. The group has four main operating segments. The China E-commerce Group – comprising Taobao, Tmall, and the newly launched Taobao Instant Commerce – is the group’s core cash generator. The International Digital Commerce Group (AIDC) covers AliExpress, Lazada, and Trendyol (the leading e-commerce platform in Turkey). Cloud Intelligence houses Alibaba Cloud and the Qwen AI model family. All Others includes logistics (Cainiao), digital entertainment (Hujing DME), health (Alibaba Health), and local services (Amap).

 

9M26 financials largely impacted by intense price wars

 
Alibaba’s 9MFY26 (April to December 2025) financials tell a tale of two forces: a resilient top line and a deliberately compressed bottom line. Group revenue rose a modest 2.7% year-on-year (YoY) to RMB 780.3b. However, adjusting for the disposal of Sun Art and Intime in early 2025, we estimate underlying revenue growth for continuing operations to be closer to 10-11%, indicating a meaningfully stronger organic performance.

 
Profitability, however, declined sharply. Group adjusted EBITA* fell 49.2% YoY to RMB 71.3b in 9MFY26, with margins contracting from 18.5% (9MFY25) to 9.1%. We highlight that this compression is almost entirely attributable to two discrete investment decisions (mentioned below) rather than structural business deterioration.

 
*EBITA is a derivation of EBITDA that still reflects depreciation, given the capital-intensive nature of its cloud and logistics businesses


First, the April 2025 launch of Taobao Instant Commerce led to an aggressive expansion into quick commerce, alongside heavy subsidies to build consumer mindshare. As a result, selling and marketing expenses rose 77.7% YoY to RMB 191.6b, materially weighing on earnings. Consequently, China E-commerce Group’s adjusted EBITA fell 45.6% YoY to RMB 83.5b in 9MFY26 (9MFY25: RMB 153.5b), while margins compressed from 39.1% to 19.3%. This is the most significant driver of Alibaba’s earnings compression. Second, adjusted EBITA losses in the “All others” segment more than doubled to RMB -14.6b (9MFY25: RMB -6.1b), reflecting continued investment in newer initiatives such as AI foundation models and related ecosystem development. In contrast, the Cloud Intelligence segment remained a bright spot, with adjusted EBITA rising 28.7% YoY to RMB 10.5b, underscoring improving profitability in a key growth driver.

 
Cash flow generation also weakened during the period. Operating cash flow (OCF) fell 51% YoY to RMB 66.8b, while capital expenditure increased 58% YoY to RMB 96.1b, driven by continued investment in cloud infrastructure and in the quick commerce rollout. Consequently, free cash flow (FCF) swung negative to an outflow of RMB 29.3b.

  
Overall, Alibaba’s 9MFY26 performance was largely negatively impacted by the intense price competition seen in China’s e-commerce sector, particularly from peers such as Meituan and JD, prompting elevated subsidies to retain market share. Looking ahead, we think 9MFY26 could mark a trough in adjusted EBITA for the Chinese E-commerce segment. Regulatory measures aimed at curbing unsustainable price competition should support a gradual normalisation in profitability, particularly within the core China E-commerce segment.  

Dominant local e-commerce business anchors Alibaba’s earnings

 
Over the past five years, Alibaba has derived the bulk of its core profits from the China E-commerce Group (see table 1 below). On a trailing twelve-month basis (TTM), this segment generated RMB 125.2b in adjusted EBITA at a 23.5% margin – representing roughly 121% of the total group adjusted EBITA of RMB 103.9b. Aside from the Cloud Intelligence segment, which has only recently become a consistent positive contributor, the China E-commerce business is effectively subsidising the rest of the group.

 
We note the durability of this dominance; annual adjusted EBITA from this segment has held between RMB 182b and RMB 214b over the past five fiscal years, despite intensifying competition from players such as PDD holdings and ByteDance’s Douyin, both of which have scaled aggressively across e-commerce and livestreaming. As seen in chart 2 below, the TTM adjusted EBITA margin of 23.5% is significantly lower than the high 30s – mid 40+% range seen in the past five years. However, we do not view this margin compression as reflective of a structurally weaker business – rather, it reflects Alibaba’s ongoing investment cycle in quick commerce, alongside elevated subsidy spending to defend market share during the intense price war.

 
Looking ahead, regulatory measures aimed at curbing unsustainable price competition should alleviate subsidy pressures. In our view, this shift is likely to disproportionately benefit Alibaba, given its position as the market leader in China’s local e-commerce landscape. As competitive subsidy intensity moderates, we expect China E-commerce EBITA margins to recover toward the 30% range–still below historical peaks, but more reflective of a steady-state that incorporates continued investment in quick commerce. We also note management’s commentary that, despite near-term earnings volatility, the unit economics of the quick commerce segment have shown month-on-month improvement, suggesting a gradual path toward profitability (by FY29, or 3 years away, according to management).

  

Table 1: Historical EBITA contribution from Alibaba’s 4 operating segments 


Contribution Mix to EBITA (%)

FY21

FY22

FY23

FY24

FY25

9MFY25

9MFY26

China E-commerce

125%

140%

128%

118%

113%

109%

117%

International Digital Commerce

-3%

-7%

-3%

-5%

-9%

-8%

-3%

Cloud Intelligence

-1%

1%

3%

4%

6%

6%

15%

All Others (excluding unallocated / inter-segment eliminations)

-17%

-27%

-17%

-12%

-7%

-4%

-20%

Note: Alibaba’s fiscal year ends 31 March (FY21: year ending 31 March 2021)

Data as of 31 December 2025

Source: Company data, iFAST compilations.


Chart 2: Historical EBITA margin for the China E-commerce segment  



Increasing monetisation of Cloud/AI businesses strengthens earnings resilience

  
While China E-commerce provides the earnings floor, the Cloud Intelligence segment is emerging as the key driver of incremental growth. Revenue grew 32.5% YoY to RMB 116.5b in 9MFY26, with growth accelerating sequentially from 26% in 1QFY26 to 34% in 2Q and 36% in 3Q – an uncommon trajectory for a business of this scale. Notably, AI-related product revenue has delivered triple-digit YoY growth for 10 consecutive quarters and now contributes more than 20% of external cloud revenues.

 
Crucially for bondholders, this growth is translating into earnings. Adjusted EBITA increased 28.7% YoY to RMB 10.5b in 9MFY26, with margins holding steady at roughly 9%. The ability to scale while maintaining margin discipline underscores the segment’s potential to become a consistent and meaningful earnings contributor alongside China E-commerce.

 
Adoption metrics further reinforce this trajectory. The Qwen family of models surpassed 1 billion cumulative downloads as of January 2026, while the Qwen consumer app exceeded 300 million monthly active users by February 2026. Despite this traction, we believe the monetisation cycle remains in its early stages. As usage scales, inference-related revenue should grow faster than the underlying infrastructure cost curve, supporting gradual margin expansion. Alibaba Cloud’s market-leading position also provides structural support. Its full-stack AI ecosystem– spanning foundation models (Qwen), inference infrastructure, and enterprise deployment platforms (Model Studio, Platform for AI)–creates meaningful switching costs, strengthening customer retention while supporting both revenue and margin expansion.

 
Looking ahead, we expect Cloud Intelligence to become the group’s primary EBITA growth driver. Management has guided for sustained cloud revenue momentum, supported by increasing demand for model services, token consumption, and application-layer usage. Pricing is also expected to trend upward gradually through contract renewals and new customer wins. Taken together, we see scope for EBITA margins to expand from the current ~9% toward the low-teens, setting the stage for a structurally stronger and more diversified earnings profile.

  

Chart 3: Historical revenue growth for Cloud EBITA + increase in Cloud EBITA margin 


Source: Company data, iFAST compilations. 
Data as of 31 December 2025

Fortress balance sheet with ample liquidity and decent coverage

 
On the liquidity front, as of 31 December 2025, Alibaba holds RMB 128.2b in cash and RMB 180.0 b in short-term investments, amounting to a total available liquidity of RMB 308.2 billion. Against total borrowings of RMB 262.7b (including RMB 24.7b in short-term borrowings), this translates into a net cash position of RMB 45.5b, providing a meaningful buffer to support its ongoing investment cycle. As seen in Table 2 below, while the group’s net cash position has moderated in recent years due to rising capex, it remains firmly positive.

 
In terms of coverage, TTM interest coverage (adjusted EBITA / gross interest expense) stands at 10.3x (see table 2 below), indicating ample capacity to service its interest obligations. Notably, this level of coverage likely reflects a trough of the group’s adjusted EBITA, given the temporary pressure from elevated subsidy spending during the recent price war. As profitability in the China E-commerce segment normalises, we expect coverage to improve correspondingly.

  
On the cash flow front, TTM OCF came in at RMB 94.3b (9.3% margin), below historical averages (see chart 4 below). Looking ahead, we expect OCF to recover, supported by a reduction in subsidy intensity and stabilisation in core China e-commerce profitability.

 
Capex, however, has trended sharply higher, driven by investments in both quick commerce infrastructure and cloud capacity. While we expect capex to remain elevated–and potentially increase further in the near term–we believe Alibaba’s normalised OCF generation, together with its strong liquidity position, is sufficient to absorb these outlays.  Government support, including subsidies covering up to 50% of qualifying data centre costs, should also help offset part of the investment burden.

 
Consequently, FCF is likely to remain under pressure in the near to intermediate term. Although FCF swung to an outflow of RMB 29.3b in 9MFY26, we expect this to be cyclical rather than structural. As OCF recovers, FCF should gradually revert to positive territory over the medium term. Our base case does not assume a sustained period of negative FCF, but rather a cyclical dip driven by capex investments.
  

Chart 4: Increasing capex pressuring Alibaba’s free cash flow generation


Source: Company data, iFAST compilations. 
Data as of 31 December 2025


Table 2: Leverage & Credit metrics have moderated, but remain solid 


Credit Metrics

FY21

FY22

FY23

FY24

FY25

9MFY26

31 Mar 2021

31 Mar 2022

31 Mar 2023

31 Mar 2024

31 Mar 2025

31 Dec 2025

Interest Coverage Ratio (Adjusted EBITA / Gross Interest Cost)

38x

27x

25x

21x

18x

10.3x*

Net Debt / EBITA

NM**

NM**

NM**

NM**

NM**

NM**

* Figure is derived using TTM figures

**NM: not material as Alibaba holds a net cash position

Data as of 31 December 2025

Source: Company data, iFAST compilations.


Bond recommendations


Table 3: About Alibaba's bonds


Issue

Issuer

Ask Price

Yield to Worst (%)

Years to Maturity

Credit Rating (S&P / Moody’s / Fitch)

BABA 3.400% 06Dec2027 Corp (USD)

Alibaba Group Holding Limited

98.99

4.07%

1.58

A+ / A1 / A

BABA 4.875% 26May2030 Corp (USD)

Alibaba Group Holding Limited

101.54

4.45%

4.05

A+ / A1 / A

BABA 2.125% 09Feb2031 Corp (USD)

Alibaba Group Holding Limited

90.69

4.31%

4.76

A+ / A1 / A

BABA 4.500% 28Nov2034 Corp (USD)

Alibaba Group Holding Limited

98.34

4.74%

8.57

A+ / A1 / A

BABA 5.250% 26May2035 Corp (USD)

Alibaba Group Holding Limited

102.74

4.86%

9.06

A+ / A1 / A

BIDU 4.375% 29Mar2028 Corp (USD)

Baidu Inc

100.25

4.22%

1.90

- / A3 / A

BIDU 3.425% 07Apr2030 Corp (USD)

Baidu Inc

96.96

4.28%

3.92

- / A3 / A

JD 3.375% 14Jan2030 Corp (USD)

JD.com, Inc.

97.27

4.18%

3.70

A- / A3 / -

KUAISH 4.125% 22Jan2031 Corp (USD)

Kuaishou Technology

98.77

4.42%

4.71

A- / A3 / A-

KUAISH 4.750% 22Jan2036 Corp (USD)

Kuaishou Technology

97.36

5.10%

9.72

A- / A3 / A-

MEITUA 4.500% 02Apr2028 Corp (USD)

Meituan

99.87

4.57%

1.91

BBB+ / Baa1 / BBB+

MEITUA 3.050% 28Oct2030 Corp (USD)

Meituan

92.55

4.93%

4.48

BBB+ / Baa1 / BBB+

MEITUA 4.500% 05May2031 Corp (USD)

Meituan

97.77

5.01%

5.00

BBB+ / Baa1 / BBB+

MEITUA 5.125% 05Nov2035 Corp (USD)

Meituan

97.91

5.41%

9.50

BBB+ / Baa1 / BBB+

TENCNT 3.595% 19Jan2028 Corp (USD)

Tencent Holdings Limited

99.24

4.06%

1.70

A+ / A1 / A

TENCNT 2.390% 03Jun2030 Corp (USD)

Tencent Holdings Limited

93.32

4.19%

4.08

A+ / A1 / A

TENCNT 2.880% 22Apr2031 Corp (USD)

Tencent Holdings Limited

94.16

4.20%

4.96

A+ / A1 / A

WB 3.375% 08Jul2030 Corp (USD)

Weibo Corporation

94.33

4.90%

4.17

BBB / Baa2 / -

XIAOMI 3.375% 29Apr2030 Corp (USD)

Xiaomi Best Time International Limited

96.02

4.48%

3.98

BBB / Baa1 / BBB+

XIAOMI 2.875% 14Jul2031 Corp (USD)

Xiaomi Best Time International Limited

92.35

4.55%

5.19

BBB / Baa1 / BBB+

Data as of 07 May 2026.

Source: Bloomberg, Bondsupermart, iFAST compilations.


Overall, Alibaba’s credit profile has softened because of the intense price war and increasing capex spend to grow its cloud and quick commerce segments. Looking ahead, regulatory relief should support a normalisation of China's e-commerce profitability, while increasing AI monetisation provides an additional tailwind – together, these factors should stabilise the group’s credit profile. That said, we emphasise that the planned increase in Capex spend should continue pressuring FCF. Overall, our base case for Alibaba’s credit profile is to stabilise moving forward.

 
As seen in Table 3 above, we compare Alibaba’s outstanding bonds against the comparable outstanding issues of its Chinese tech peers. In general, we find Alibaba’s bonds to be fairly priced. Against comparable US sovereigns of similar tenors, we highlight a decent 25-50+bps yield spread, given the strong A rating of both Alibaba and its bonds.

 
For investors looking for an alternative to US sovereigns, Alibaba’s outstanding bonds are a worthwhile consideration, given the improving operating outlook.





 
Declaration: For specific disclosure, at the time of publication of this report, IFPL (via its connected and associated entities) holds NIL positions, and the analyst who produced this report holds NIL positions in the abovementioned securities. This research report was prepared with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. iFAST Financial Pte Ltd does not rely exclusively on AI for content generation; the content of this report – including all investment theses, ratings, price targets and conclusions – has been independently reviewed and verified by the research analyst(s) to ensure accuracy and professional integrity.




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